ABSTRACT Vehicular ad hoc networks can be viewed as a typical context-aware system where the experienced context frequently varies as vehicles move along road, e.g., signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), velocity, and traffic flow. In particular, the adopted security protection mechanisms often depend on the node state, location, and/or surrounding risk, which need the capability of context-aware security quantification. This paper views the security level as a user's inherent property that is only correlated with the user's behaviours and the situated context and independent of the suffered attack ways. We propose a formalized methodology to especially quantify the security level in real time from the perspective of state transition probability through estimating the stable probability of staying in the security state in inhomogeneous continuous time Markov chain. This paradigm enables users to customize the security protection mechanisms for adapting to the frequently varying context. We conduct the extensive numerical calculations and empirical analysis to comprehensively investigate the response of the proposed security quantification framework to the various combinations of the concerned parameters, e.g., SNR, velocity, and traffic flow. The results show that the proposed framework is capable of capturing the real-time security level adaptively to the vehicular context and provides a dependable decision basis to security protection, which can restrict the security to a target value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have tremendous potential to improve vehicle and road safety, traffic efficiency, and convenience since enabling the information dissemination between vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicleto-infrastructures (V2I) [1] - [3] . VANETs are characterized differently from the traditional wired network by the quick movement, unreliable channel, and short-lived link. These characteristics emphasize the context-aware ability to handle the right information using the appropriate ways at the proper time, and also pose many security protection challenges. Since the medium is open in VANETs [4] , [5] , appropriate security mechanism is a must on the top list of priority before extensive deployment. Many efforts have been made in countermeasures against malicious attacks and improvements of security defense, e.g., authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation [6] . However, the security quantification problem is still quite open, especially concerning the dynamic contextawareness. Accurate security quantification is prerequisite for adaptive security mechanism decision. Therefore, this paper aims to objectively quantify the security level adaptively to the experienced context so as to observe the current security level and accordingly adopt proper security protection mechanisms (SPMs).
Context is defined as ''any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity'' [7] . Contextawareness is an ability to dynamically capture and use the surrounding contextual information of a mobile entity to improve the performance of the system and to allow computing devices to make appropriate and timely decisions on behalf of users [8] . Most of today's SPMs are static to enforce policies predefined in advance in networks where the entity relationships and the facing risks are relatively static. This is no longer sufficient in an environment that is highly dynamic like VANETs. Rapidly changing internetworking topology and threat environments, as well as application demands, are stressing static security enforcement models [9] . Since VANETs seriously depend on mobile nodes, the security environment facing in the network is not fixed and stable. Owing to the nature of these mobile nodes, VANETs are challenged with the frequently changing topology as well as physical threats [10] , [11] . Also, despite the best efforts of the software architects and coders, there are always some residual and unintended faults and security vulnerabilities present in the system, which causes vulnerabilities for potential attackers to VANETs. SPMs should behave adaptively to the frequently changing context by incorporating additional context at the point when a security decision is made. To this end, one well-defined metric of security level is prerequisite for timely awareness of the current quality of security.
In most previous literature [12] , security is mainly quantified from the viewpoint of attacker rather than a user's view. However, the employed attack method by the attacker is transparent to the target users in practice. So the users are incapable of quantifying security regarding the on-going suffered attack methods from their own viewpoints, and thus SPMs fail to behave adaptively and flexibly to the elapsed security level against the potential attack ways. In fact, the security extent should be viewed as a user's inherent property that is only correlated with the user's subjective behaviours and the experienced context but not with the attacker. This idea is similar to the assessment of human health, which only needs to be measured from the view of body check and the survival environment but without needing to inject virus. The candidate adversary models are difficultly formalized to cover all the possible cases of attacks, which unavoidably lead to a wrong estimation of the security situation of mobile users. A reasonable quantification criterion should be objective and independent of the suffered attack way, which is a main difference between the existing work and this paper. Context-aware security quantification is the use of supplemental information to improve security decisions at the time that the decision is made, resulting in more accurate security decisions capable of supporting more dynamic networking environments. Context awareness helps make security an enabler, not an inhibitor to replace legacy static security infrastructure, such as firewalls. So the quantified security level should be in capable of timely reacting to the experienced context, which is another main advance to the literature. This paper examines a framework of security quantification that is expected to be applicable but not limited to VANETs and independent of the suffered attack way. VANET is a time-varying system, so we use inhomogeneous continuous time Markov chain (ICTMC) to describe its security dynamics. We define a finite state set, i.e., security state S s , vulnerable state S v , attacked state S a , positive state S p , negative state S n , degenerate state S d , and failure stateS f , and different states can mutually transit from one to another. We quantify security level through predicting the stable probability of staying in the security state S s in ICTMC. We perform the extensive numerical calculations and empirical analysis to investigate the applicability of the proposed framework, and the results show the quantification method could reasoningly capture the fluctuation of security level against the experienced context, e.g., SNR, velocity, and traffic flow. One note is that our main technical contribution is a computational security framework that certainly could embrace more contextual factors rather than only the exampled three. Regarding the dynamic characteristics of VANETs, we considered these three factors are of obviousness and significance to affect the security level. For example, traffic flow indicates the neighbor vehicle density that implies the eavesdropping risk by the potential observers. Therefore, the contextual factors including but not limited to SNR, traffic flow and velocity.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized by (i) quantifying the security level in real time by ICTMC from the viewpoint of the users' behaviors and the experienced context, instead of the suffered attack ways, (ii) enabling users to customize the security protection mechanisms for adapting to the frequently varying context, (iii) the formalized methodology is expected to be applicable but not limited to VANETs, and (iv) conducting the extensive numerical calculations and empirical analysis to investigate the effectivity and efficiency of the proposed computational security framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the related work. Section 3 introduces the proposed ICTMC model in detail, followed by the extensive numerical calculations and empirical analysis in Section 4. Finally, we draw some conclusions and give the future work in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Some progresses are already available in evaluating security of information system in qualitative or quantitative method. Lee [13] proposed a practical advice for evaluating information security risk that is combination with AHP and Fuzzy comprehensive methods. Mermigas et al. [14] proposed to use stochastic calculus to quantify the security of information systems. Wolf and Scheibel [15] presented a methodical approach for conducting a meaningful security risk analysis, which focused particularly on vehicular IT system. This approach applies systematic estimations for the two mandatory factors of any risk analysis, the potential damages and the probability of a successful security attack, both of which are based on industry-proven methods and taxonomies carefully adapted to vehicular IT security scenarios.
At the hand of the security assessment in software systems, Ben Aissa et al. [16] proposed a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security breakdown. Haimes [17] raised a metric VOLUME 4, 2016 name ''attack surface'' through introducing two notions: the damage potential and the effort. Manadhata and Wing [18] also proposed to use the measure of a system's attack surface as an indication to quantify a software system's security. Halkidis et al. [19] proposed an attempt to evaluate known security patterns based on how well they follow each principle, and how well they encounter with possible problems in building secure software. Madan et al. [20] raised a method on modeling and quantifying the security attributes of software systems through using the semi-Markov process model to capture the attacker's behaviors and the system's response to an intrusion.
The advances to the other related aspects of evaluating security also inspire this paper much. Gilb and Holtersvei [21] proposed a security specification with information about risks, issues, dependencies and priorities in a quantified way to express the richness of security needs and to balance security investment with other system quality needs. Homer et al. [22] presented a practical approach that utilizes the existing work in attack graphs and individual vulnerability metrics, e.g. CVSS, and applies probabilistic reasoning to produce a sound risk measurement to quantify security risk in enterprise network. Carin et al. [23] raised a computational approach to quantitative cyber security risk assessment that is designed to answer questions such as how much to invest, which security measures have the most impact, and how much improvement in security has been achieved. Ortalo et al. [24] described a methodology as a privilege graph for modeling known Unix security vulnerabilities. Verendel [12] showed that the quantified security is a weak hypothesis because of a lack of validation and comparison between such methods against empirical data. Juneja et al. [25] categorized the metrics found or to be found, which is essential for security quantification, but not to produce a method for assessing the security level. Li et al. [26] presented and studied a ContextAware Security and Trust framework for MANETs, in which various contextual information, such as communication channel status, battery status, and weather condition, were collected and then used to determine whether the misbehavior was likely a result of malicious activity or not.
Many efforts are also made in enhancing security for VANETs. Chen et al. [27] provided an analysis of VANETs security base on routing protocol information. They divided the information type into four categories based on different content and analyzed the security threats in different information type, then summarized the existing security technologies and gave the possible research directions. Yan et al. [28] proposed a novel approach to enhancing position security in VANETs. They achieved local security by enlisting the help of on-board radar to detect neighboring vehicles and to confirm their announced coordinates, then the global security was achieved by using preset position-based groups to create a communication network. Choi and Jung [29] raised a security framework with strong non-repudiation and privacy using new approach of ID-based cryptosystem in VANETs. Rawat et al. [30] analyzed probabilistic and deterministic approaches to estimate trust for VANETs security. Mejri et al. [31] classified all existing security problems in VANETs from a cryptographic point of view. Li and Song [32] proposed an attack-resistant trust management scheme (ART) for VANETs that was able to detect and cope with malicious attacks and also evaluate the trustworthiness of both data and mobile nodes in VANETs. Ekedebe et al. [33] discussed various security and privacy issues in transportation cyber-physical systems (CPSs), reviewed various defense mechanisms to improve security and privacy in transportation CPSs. They also showed ITS and VANETs were the networking infrastructure of transportation CPSs and the application of CPSs technology would transform the way people interact with highway transportation systems.
Despite of many researches on the security enhancement technology for VANETs, there are few studies in quantifying security for VANETs. Security quantification is quite important for context-aware adaptive security protection mechanisms. Most previous studies generally perform the security assessment through a brute force model. Thus the security level has to be quantified regarding the attacker's capability, but such quantification is complex and costly, which limits its practical applicability and deployment. Furthermore, considering the specificity of VANETs, a time-varying network, we propose to adopt a context-aware method to quantify the security level. In this paper, we propose a model called ICTMC to forecast the security value. We define a finite multi-state model to describe state transition process, and every state transition is treated as an inhomogeneous Poisson process (IPP) whose intensity corresponds to the dynamic context, e.g., velocity, traffic flow, and SNR. Accordingly, we uniform the ICTMC to compute the probability-transition matrix, divide T into multiple time slots, and employ the mean IPP intensity of ICTMC to replace the Poisson process intensity of homogeneous continuous time Markov chain (HCTMC), by such way we can finally obtain the probability of each state of ICTMC, e.g. the security state to indicate the security level.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the background concepts of inhomogeneous continuous time Markov chain. Then we give the expression and solution of security quantification model with respect to the probability of staying in the security state.
A. ICTMC Model Fig. 1 illustrates the ICTMC model where the state set I ={S s , S v , S a , S p , S n , S d , S f } can be mutually transited as a framework of describing the dynamic behaviors of security in VANETs. Due to the dynamic nature of VANETs, the security is undoubtedly influenced by the experienced context, e.g., velocity, traffic flow, and SNR, and thus the ICTMC model is suitable for figuring out VANETs.
The state transition of ICTMC model can be described as follows. (i) If the defensive strategies, e.g., authentication, access control, encryption, and patch for known vulnerabilities, lose efficacy, the system shall enter the vulnerable state S v from the security state S s , and easily suffers from being penetrated and explored by an attacker. But if intercepting the attacks before intrusion, the system could still stay in the state S s . (ii) If detecting the attacks during being penetrated and explored, the system could return to the state S s from the vulnerable state S v . The system shall frequently scan the present state, and could immediately launch the proper countermeasure upon detecting attacks. (iii) If the vulnerability is exploited successfully, the system shall be under the attacked state S a and the potential damage may occur. In the attacked state S a , the system has to conduct various possible approaches to recovering from damage and to mitigating the loss. Although there might be more than one response available, the system principally aims to restore the security state S s . (iv) If the system eliminates all destructive effects caused by an attack and successfully restores the security state S s , and then the system shall enter into the positive state S p . (v) By transparent recovery, the system shall recover from the positive state S p to the security state S s . (vi) If the system fails to recognize the active attacks and thus takes no response, the system shall enter the negative state S n . (vii) If having detected attacks but unable to eliminate all the influences, the system has to shrink the extent of damage while maintaining the essential service, which is called the degenerate state S d . The essential services refer to the functionalities that should be maintained to satisfy the systemic requirements even if facing the hostile, failures, and accidents. (viii) If the above countermeasures do not work at all, the system has to enter the failure state S f finally. (ix), (x) and (xi) By manual intervention, the system recovers the full services after an attack and returns to the security state S s from the negative state S n , the degenerate state S d , and the failure state S f , respectively. To reduce the possibility of future attacks, it may be required to use reconfiguration and evolution.
B. SECURITY QUANTIFICATION Model
Generally, a HCTMC is derived from a model, e.g., a queuing network, a block diagram, a stochastic automata network and alike [34] , [35] , where each state transition is triggered by an event. Therefore, we can uniform a HCTMC X through its embedded homogeneous discrete time Markov chain (HDTMC) Y and Poisson process N , where Y represents the sequence of states traversed by X , and N indicates the jumping times of X . Following the literature [36] , [37] , we assume that Y and N are independent from each other, so the state probability of X is defined as:
We assume the initial probability vector of HCTMC is δ(0), the probability transition matrix is P, and the intensity of Poisson process N is λ, so the state probability vector δ(t) of HCTMC at time t is defined as:
Similarly, ICTMC can be described by IDTMC with transition probability matrix P(t) = (p ij (t)), where p ij (t) is the transition probability from state i to state j at time t, i, j ∈ I , and IPP with intensity λ(t). Since the ICTMC is dependent on time, the transition probability matrix of IDTMC is time variable. Knowing the initial state probability vector δ(0), we cannot calculate the final state probability vector δ(T ) at time T using ICTMC, and thus we divide the duration [0, T ] into H slots, i.e. T = H 0 t, and each time slot t is a homogeneous process. Therefore, the goal within each slot is to compute δ(t + t) from a known vector δ(t). Since each time slot t is a homogeneous Markov process, we replace the homogeneous Poisson process intensity by the mean intensity of IPP during time slot t. Fig. 2 shows the embedded IDTMC model for ICTMC where there are 7 states and 11 transition states. Every transition between two states is activated by an event, so there are 11 triggering events. Each event is described by a rate function λ (ij) (t) and a transition rate matrix Q (ij) (t), i, j ∈ I . For example, λ (sv) (t) represents the rate function from security state S s to vulnerable state S v at time t. The uniformization of ICTMC depends on the probability transition matrix of IDTMC and superposition of IPP intensity. Consequently, we could obtain the probability transition matrix P(t) of IDTMC and IPP intensity λ (ij) (t) by using the following steps. Step (i) Define 11 IPPs, each of which corresponds to a triggering event. Utilize λ (ij) (t) to represent each IPP intensity that depends on the contextual factors, e.g., velocity v(t), traffic flow f (t), and SNR snr(t).
We name the transition from a good state to a bad state as a downward transition, otherwise an upward transition. Intuitively, uncertain factors become complex as the traffic flow f (t) increases, which implies the present network is crowded and highly risky, and thus easily leads to a downward transition. Comparatively, as velocity v(t) improves, it infers a free phase and satisfactory network as well as traffic condition, so tending to a upward transition. SNR is the ratio of signal power and noise power. Communication quality can be improved as SNR increases; otherwise communication happens to deteriorate as SNR decreases, which implies that the suffered interference increases and thus the attacking possibility is of high level. So the exampled contextual factor C(t) at time t is defined as:
Obviously, each IPP intensity λ (ij) (t) is different, so we introduce an intensity parameter k (ij) 
Step (ii) The superposition (t) of 11 IPPs' intensities is defined as:
Step (iii) The transition rate matrix Q(t) of IDTMC is defined as (7), shown at the bottom of this page.
Matrix Q(t) can express the state transition caused by event occurrence at time t. Accordingly, the rate of transition from state i to state j at time t is given by q (ij) (t). Let the row sum of matrix Q equal 0, so:
Step (iv) Decompose Q(t) to get the transition rate matrix Q (ij) (t) of each event, (9) as shown at the bottom of this page 
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Step (v) Calculate transition probability matrix P(t).
We define a matrix P as follows:
Obviously, P is a random matrix, for all i, j
Consequently, the probability transition matrix P(t) of IDTMC is defined as:
ICTMC is composed of 11 sub-ICTMCs, and each sub-ICTMC is determined by both an IPP with intensity λ (ij) u/d (t) and a DTMC probability transition matrix P (ij) . The occurrence probability of event at time t is
(t) , then the VOLUME 4, 2016 transition matrix of the embedded IDTMC is P (ij) and the resulted matrix at time tcould be obtained via the weighted summation of matrixes P (ij ) for all event types.
Step (vi) Compute each state probability of ICTMC. The mean intensity of an event within time slot t is defined as:λ
The mean intensity of all events within time slot t is defined as: (24) Substituting (22)- (24) into (2), we obtain (25):
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we first introduce the parameters used in the numerical calculation and empirical analysis. Then we give the numerical results, followed by the empirical analysis by Matlab.
A. PARAMETERS
A secure VANET prefers to stay in state S s as long as possible. Due to some well-known reasons in the internal system and external context, the system is apt to enter the vulnerable state S v . So, we rationally assume the transition rate towards the attack state S a from the vulnerable state S v by potential attack is less than that of entering the security state S s from the vulnerable state S v by successful detection. Therefore, we set k sv = 1, k vs = 0.7, and k va = 0.3. The system shall take a fast response to the suffered attacks. But if failing to intercept the attacks, the system shall enter the serious state S a . It is quite difficult to thoroughly clean the influence of attacks, so there is little rate to enter the positive state S p from the attack state S a . Additionally, once entering the positive state S p , the system shall certainly return to the security state S s . Similarly, there is also little rate of system entering the negative state S n because of completely ignoring attacks. With the help of human intervention, the system could restore the security state S s . The negative state S n and positive state S p are two extreme cases. Actually, the system is more likely to enter the degenerate state S d , and though taking a positive response but failing to remove all the traces of attacks. Therefore, we set k ap = 0.3, k an = 0.2, k ad = 0.5, k ps = 0.3, and k ns = 0.2. If entering the degenerate state S d , the system has to conduct human intervention for avoiding to enter the failure state S f . The state S f is the worst situation in which the system may collapse, and thus should try to block it happen. Therefore, there is little rate of system entering the failure state S f from the degenerate state S d . If no timely action is taken, the system would enter the failure state S f , which is quite serious and needs to be restored in time. Once entering the state S d and state S f , the system has to take human intervention to recover back to the state S s in time. So we set k df = 0.2, k ds = 0.1, and k fs = 0.1. According to the above analysis, we assume the initial probability of IDTMC model is δ(0) = {0.35, 0.26, 0.12, 0.05, 0.04, 0.15, 0.03}. A rational system should have little probability to enter the attack state S a before tackling all the threats in time. Therefore, the system is more likely to stay in the state S s and state S v than the others. If entering the attack state S a , the system prefers to stay in the degenerate state S d , so the initial probability of state S d is relatively high.
B. NUMERICAL CALCULATION
The probability of each state is determined by the transition probability p ij (t) that is only related to the transition rate matrix Q (ij) (t) and intensity λu/d (ij) (t). Q (ij) (t) depends on λu/d (ij) (t) that is related to contextual factors, e.g., velocity v (t) , vehicle flow f (t) , and SNR snr(t). Therefore, the probability of each state is associated with contextual factors, e.g. velocity v(t), vehicle flow f (t), and SNR snr(t). Without losing generality, we set v(t), f (t), and snr(t) ∈ [0, 1]. FIGURE 3. Effects of snr on the security state probability δ s against time t where v = 0.5 and f = 0.5. Fig. 3 shows the effects of snr on the security state probability δ s against time t, where the security state probability δ s increases as snr increases. This is because C value is increased as snr increases, and thus the Poisson process intensity λ (vs) u from S v to S s becomes strong. Moreover, when snr=0.1 and 0.3, δ s gradually decreases to a stable value as time t elapses, and the smaller the snr value is, the faster the δ s value decreases. In the other cases of snr, δ s conversely climbs up to a smooth value as time t increases, and the bigger the snr value is, the faster the δ s value grows. This is because snr and v are of equivalent positions in C but are opposite to f . In the numerical calculation, v = 0.5 and f = 0.5, so when snr < 0.5, the upward transition intensity of (5) becomes weak, and the downward transition intensity of (4) is relatively strong. The less the snr value is, the weaker the upward transition intensity becomes, and the stronger the downward transition intensity becomes. When snr=0.5, δ s becomes smooth. When snr > 0.5, the bigger the snr value is, the stronger the upward transition intensity becomes, and the weaker the downward transition intensity becomes. Fig. 4 gives the effects of v on the security state probability δ s against time t. Since the contributions of v and snr in C are equivalent, the security state probability δ s behaves similarly to the variation of v and snr. Concretely speaking, the security state probability δ s increases as the v value increases, which is because C value is improved as v increases, and thus the Poisson process intensity λ (vs) u from S v state to S s state becomes strong. When v = 0.1 and 0.3, δ s also decreases to a smooth value as t increases, and the smaller the v value is, the faster the δ s value decreases. In the other cases of v, δ s increases to a smooth value as t increases. The bigger the v value is, the faster the δ s value grows. This is also because snr and v are of equivalent positions in C but are opposite to f . In the numerical calculations, snr=0.5 and f = 0.5, so when v < 0.5, the upward transition intensity of (5) becomes weak, and the downward transition intensity of (4) is relatively strong. The less the v value is, the weaker the upward transition intensity becomes, and the stronger the downward transition intensity becomes. When v = 0.5, δ s becomes smooth. When v < 0.5, the bigger the v value is, the stronger the upward transition intensity becomes, and the weaker the downward transition intensity becomes. Fig. 5 shows the effects of f on the security state probability δ s against time t. Since the positions of f and snr in C are opposite, the security state probability δ s makes the reverse reaction to f and snr. The security state probability δ s decreases as f increases, which is because C value decreases as f increases, and thus the Poisson process intensity λ (vs) u from S v to S s becomes weak. When f = 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5, δ s increases to a stable value as t elapses. The smaller the f value is, the faster the δ s value increases. In the other cases of f , δ s gradually decreases to smooth as t increases. The bigger the f value is, the faster the δ s value decreases. This is also because snr and v are of equivalent positions in C but opposite to f . In the numerical calculation, snr=0.5 and v = 0.5, so when f > 0.5, the upward transition intensity of (5) becomes strong, and the downward transition intensity of (4) is relatively weak. The less the f value is, the stronger the upward transition intensity becomes, and the weaker the downward transition intensity becomes. When f = 0.5, δ s becomes smooth. When f > 0.5, the bigger the f value is, the weaker the upward transition intensity becomes, and the stronger the downward transition intensity becomes. 6 shows the effects of snr on each state δ x , where the security state probability δ s increases but the vulnerable state δ v decreases as snr increases. In Fig. 6 , δ s value initially VOLUME 4, 2016 goes down a bit and then climbs up, which is because C value increases as snr increases, and thus all the upward intensities of (5) become strong in spite of λ (vs) u , and all the downward intensities of (4) are relatively weak. Since each transition has its intensity parameter k (ij) , the different effects of snr on transition intensity λ (ij)(vs) u/d result in the difference of δ s .
FIGURE 7.
Effects of v on each state δx where snr=0.5 and f = 0.5. Fig. 7 shows the effects of v on each state δ x , where the security state probability δ s increases but the vulnerable state δ v decreases as v increases. This is because C value happens to increase as v value increases, and thus the upward intensity of (5) becomes strong, and the downward intensity of (4) is relatively weak. δ s value happens to change because of the same reason to Fig. 6 . Fig. 8 shows the effects of f on each state δ x , where the security state probability δ s decreases but the vulnerable state δ v increases as f increases. This is because C value is decreased as f value increases, and thus the upward intensity of (5) becomes weak, and the downward intensity of (4) is relatively strong. Similarly, δ s value changes because of the same reason to Fig. 6 .
C. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We downloaded the trace dataset from the Australian Centre for Field Robotics [38] . The file state-2009-03-01.csv contains the speed data for all vehicles collected on the 1 st of March, 2009 and all speed data is in meter per second. We extracted the speed statistics of agent 42, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 75, 76 at 10:00-11:00 am and the speed data of agent 47 at 10:00-11:00 pm. We average the speed value during one minute of each vehicle as the focused empirical data FIGURE 9. Comparison of v and security state probability δ s against time t in empirical data where snr=0.5 and f = 0.5. Fig. 9(a) shows the effect of v on the mean value and variance of the security state probability δ s in the observed window against time t. Fig. 9(b) shows the average value and variance of the concerned velocity. From Fig. 9 , one can know that the security state probability δ s is directionally proportional to velocity v, which is because velocity v is proportional to contextual factor C in (3), and C is exponential to the upward intensity λ (vs) u in (5) . Additionally, the fluctuation range 0.1 of security state probability δ s versus fluctuation range 0.3 of velocity v over the observed time window shows the proposed framework is capable of mildly quantifying the real-time security level adaptively to the vehicular context. Fig. 10 shows the variation of security state probability δ s of agent 47 over two different observed windows of daytime and nighttime, respectively. From Fig.10 , one can know that the security state probability δ s during 10:00-11:00 p.m. is a little higher than that of 10:00-11:00 a.m. averagely, which implies VANETs appear to be under more security state at nighttime compared to daytime. Moreover, the security state probability δ s during 10:00-11:00 p.m. fluctuates more violently than that of 10:00-11:00 a.m.. Fig. 11(a) shows the effect of v on each state probability of agent 54 against time t and Fig. 11(b) shows the velocity variation of agent 54. From Fig. 11 , one can know that the security state probability δ s is directionally proportional to velocity v, while the vulnerable state probability δ v is in inverse proportion. The variation of security state probability is completely contrary to the vulnerable state, which is because velocity v is proportional to contextual factor C. The faster velocity v becomes, the bigger C is, then the upward intensity λ We also analyzed average annual daily flow and temporal traffic distributions in Great Britain [39] . We extracted the traffic flow statistics of Monday and Saturday. Fig. 12 respectively shows the fluctuations of security state probability δ s and traffic flow over two different observed windows of Monday and Saturday. From Fig. 12(a) , one can learn that the security state probability δ s of Saturday is a little higher than that of Monday. From Fig. 12(b) , one can observe that the traffic flow of Monday is higher than that of Saturday, especially during 7:00-9:00 and 17:00-18:00. This is the reason why the security level of Saturday is higher than that of Monday. 
FIGURE 13.
Effect of f on each state probability δ x against time t where snr=0.5 and v = 0.5. Fig. 13 shows the effect of f on each state probability of Monday and the corresponding traffic flow variation. From  Fig. 13 , one can know that the security state probability δ s is inversely proportional to traffic flow f , while the vulnerable state probability δ v is in directional proportion. This is because traffic flow f is inversely proportional to contextual factor C. The more the traffic flow f , the smaller C, and thus the upward intensity λ 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The paper proposed a method to quantify the security level of VANETs adaptively to the frequently changed context, which includes 7 states to represent the possible security behaviors, i.e., security, vulnerable, attacked, negative, positive, degenerate, and failure state. We quantified the security level independent of the suffered attack way through predicting the stable probability of staying in the security state. Regarding the highly dynamic nature of VANETs, we adopted the time inhomogeneous Markov model to describe the security dynamics of vehicular nodes. We conducted the extensive numerical calculations and empirical analysis against various combinations of contextual factors, e.g., SNR, velocity, and traffic flow. The results show that the proposed security framework is capable of achieving context-aware security quantification.
The proposed quantification framework depends on an assumption that the present state of the system is already known. How to judge the current security state is a complex problem, which is related with many factors and not yet solved well. So the next work will be focused on solving this problem and integrating into the proposed security quantification framework. 
